

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 4, 1970


Dear Tom:

I appreciate the suggestion for a verification study of Option E contained in your memorandum of October 21. I agree that we should continue to examine our proposal and our ability to verify its provisions.

In view of your suggestion for a study of verification and of the suggestions of others that we review the survivability of our strategic forces, I discussed the entire matter with the President. As you know, the President directed that we undertake a complete review of strategic force survivability in relation to an arms control agreement.

We attempted to focus on the verification aspect in the terms of reference for the survivability study where we require a review of our ability to detect and acquire demonstrable evidence of violations of an agreement. I think this study will accomplish what you suggested.

Best regards,


Henry A. Kissinger

JCS REVIEWED 10-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

REFER TO DOS

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DOS REVIEWED 29-Aug-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-310-70
21 OCT 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, VERIFICATION PANEL

SUBJECT: Verification of the U.S. SALT Proposal (Option E)

1. The studies of U.S. verification capabilities conducted under the sponsorship of the Verification Panel have been of great value and utility in SALT. The material in them has served as a prime source in formulating the wide range of options and approaches which we considered at various stages of our development of a U.S. proposal.
2. We now have a specific U.S. proposal on the table and it seems to me that it would be highly desirable to conduct a further specific review oriented to the U.S. capabilities -- current and planned -- to verify the current U.S. proposal. Certainly a great deal of work done in the previous efforts will be applicable to the current proposal and need only to be extracted and oriented toward Option E. There are, however, some features of Option E (e.g., those related to large modern missiles) which were not specifically examined in the earlier across-the-board studies.
3. The new study would address verification of the new U.S. proposal as a comprehensive and cohesive package and thus be a prudent step in assuring that we can answer affirmatively regarding capabilities to verify the provisions of this specific U.S. proposal. Also, it would provide an additional basis against which modifications to the U.S. proposal could be weighed if such modifications become necessary or desirable.
4. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Verification Panel sponsor and direct a study of the U.S. capabilities to verify Option E. The new study would not be needed prior to or necessarily during the up-coming Helsinki phase but should be completed and in hand prior to a post-Helsinki phase.

T. H. Moorer
T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc:
DepSecDef

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10/28/70

Strategic Forces Survivability Study

This study is to assess the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces during the mid-1970s and late 1970s in the absence of an arms control agreement, under an agreement reflecting the U.S. position, under possible modifications which are suggested in the U.S. position, and under other possible modifications suggested by the initial analysis. The forces assessed should include ICBMs, FBMs, strategic bombers, and any other U.S. strategic forces which could be deployed within the time frame of the study.

(1) The Soviet threat to the survivability of each part of the U.S. strategic forces should be assessed in the absence of an agreement, when an agreement is observed, and when there are covert illegal deployments under an agreement. The costs, lead times, and uncertainties faced by the Soviets in deploying these threats should also be analyzed.

(2) Steps to improve strategic force survivability which should be analyzed include, but need not be confined to:

- Silo hardening
- Deployment of hard rock silos
- Deployment of shelter-mobile or other types of mobile ICBMs
- Deployment of Safeguard or other active defense of bombers and ICBMs.
- Replacement of ICBMs by Poseidon
- Replacement of ICBMs by ULMs
- Deployment of new systems such as long-range cruise missiles on submarines or aircraft
- ASW constraints
- Improvements in the survivability of FBMs and their communications
- Dispersing bombers and reducing their reaction time.

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In the case of steps requiring a modification of the U.S. position, particular attention should be given to the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. forces in the face of Soviet force improvements permitted by the modification.

U.S. force survivability should be assessed using the numbers of surviving launchers (and bombers) and weapons and the amount of surviving equivalent megatonnage following plausible types of Soviet attacks.

U.S. force effectiveness should be assessed using the numbers of detonating weapons and the amount of detonating equivalent megatonnage following such attacks.

(3) The effect on U.S. security of failing to retain a complete independent retaliatory capability in the three present U.S. strategic force components should be analyzed.

(4) The analysis should assess our ability to detect those improvements in Soviet forces which could affect the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces and, under an agreement, our ability to acquire demonstrable evidence of violations. These assessments should include a discussion of U.S. intelligence capabilities which are programmed or which could be deployed within the time frame of the study.

Particular attention should be given to changes in our ability to detect and acquire demonstrable evidence of violations under any modifications of the U.S. position.

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